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Thus, the Arab uprisings have not only impacted
large parts of the Arab world. Since 2011, they have
also left their mark on scholarship about Arab po-
litics, which has been preoccupied with discussing
the uprisings and their implications for a more or
less ‘new Middle East’.1 As part of this discussion,
new topics and approaches have emerged on the
scholarly agenda and at the same time it has been
discussed whether old theories and assumptions
about Middle East politics should be rejected, re-
visited or revised.2
     An example of this is the debate on Arab
authoritarianism, which in recent years has
intersected with the debate on the causes and
consequences of the current ‘sectarianization’
Middle East politics. By sectarianization, a very
contested concept,3 we mean ‘a process shaped by
political actors operating within specific contexts,
pursuing political goals that involve popular
mobilization around (religious) identity markers’4
and in the current context, are referring
specifically to some sort of Sunni- Shia cleavage
instrumentalized by actors in power struggles. We
examine the issue by exploring three interrelated
questions.
     First, we ask whether and how it is possible to
identify a sectarian dimension in the techniques
employed by authoritarian regimes as part of their
regime survival strategy.
     Based on a recognition of how authoritarian
regimes and their workings may differ from each
other, we are secondly asking whether author-
itarian regimes’ use of the ‘sectarian card’ can be
part of different kinds of regime survival
strategies.
     Finally, we adopt a longer-term perspective by
asking whether and how a sectarian in-
strumentalization of institutions matters for
authoritarian resilience in the long term. Before
we turn to addressing these three questions (based
on both synchronic comparisons and diachronic
within-case studies), the next two sections provide
a brief overview of the evolution of the scholarly
debate on Middle East authoritarianism before
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and after the beginning of the 2011 Arab uprisings,
and how it has become increasingly intersected
with the debate on sectarianism. 
A RESILIENT DEBATE
After the post-Cold War 1990s hopeful, but also
rather teleological search for signs of how the
Middle East was democratizing like other regions,
at the turn of the new millennium this
‘democracy-spotting’ was met with growing
criticism. Instead, Middle Eastern scholars were
called on to enter the ’era of post-democratization‘
and focus less on ‘what ought to be’ and more on
‘what in fact is’.5
     From this ‘post-democratization’ perspective,
the answer to the question about ‘what in fact is’
was an apparent durable but also dynamic
authoritarianism.6 In the decade before 2011, this
issue figured so prominently on the scholarly
agenda that some talked about a ‘renaissance in
the study of authoritarianism’.7This debate did not
only give rise to a major and fertile debate on the
renewal, resilience, endurance and robustness of
Arab authoritarianism. It also provided a growing
awareness of the variety of different forms of
authoritarianism, including upgraded, monar-
chical, (post) populist, and liberalized autocracies,
and of the multiple techniques employed by these
regimes in relation to elections, civil society,
authoritarian bargains, overt repression, black
knights as well as various forms of identity po-
litics, where societal groups were in/excluded
based on identity.8
     However, in the early phase of the Arab upris-
ings with the fall of authoritarian rulers such as
Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali – allegedly
the prototypes of successful ’upgraded‘ author-
itarianism – many observers thought they saw the
’fourth wave of democratization‘ unfolding.9 In
turn, ‘durable authoritarianism‘ was declared to be
nothing but a mirage.10 This optimistic position
was soon countered by pessimists, calling
attention to how the majority of Arab regimes
were and would in the foreseeable future likely
continue to be autocratic as they had shown an
increasing ability to adapt to the new challenges.11
Today, most – including previous optimists12 –
agree that it was premature to write off
authoritarianism as a thing of the past and to
declare the existing rich literature on Arab
authoritarianism as obsolete. This however does
not mean that the Middle East has just
experienced an authoritarian restoration in terms
of some sort of ‘Mubarakism without Mubarak’.13
Instead, we may be witnessing the rise of a ‘new
authoritarianism’ validating the insight from the
pre-2011 ‘post-democratization’ debate about how
it is just as important to examine changes in as
changes of authoritarianism.14
A SECTARIANIZED NEW MIDDLE EAST
In this debate about dimensions of continuity and
change in authoritarianism in the Arab world after
2011, one of the aspects that has received much
attention concerns what Hashemi and Postel have
coined as a ‘sectarianization’ of Middle East po-
litics in the wake of the Arab uprisings.15 In a
gloomy prediction, Heydemann, for instance,
states that the ‘future of Arab authoritarianism
will be darker, more repressive, more sectarian
and even more deeply resistant to democratization
than in the past.’16
     The question about sectarianism is far from a
completely new topic in debates on Middle East
politics. However, the nature of the debate has
changed in recent years.17 In the decade before the
beginning of the Arab uprisings, the main
controversy concerned the question of whether
‘conflicts within Islam will shape the future’18 or
whether the notion of a ‘Shiite Crescent’ was more
a ‘myth than reality’.19 Today, the contending issue
is less about whether or not sectarianism matters,
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as even previous skeptics now acknowledge that
‘sectarianism is a real factor in politics’.20 Instead,
attention is to a larger extent devoted to questions
regarding the causes of this ‘sectarianization’ and
its implication for various dimensions of politics
in a ‘new Middle East’, including the durability
and dynamism of authoritarianism. 
     In this way, the recent sectarianism debate has
become intersected with the ‘classic’ debate on
Arab authoritarianism. For the remainder of this
article, we are entering this nexus between
authoritarianism and sectarianism in order to
explore whether and how these two debates in
combination can contribute to our understanding
of Arab authoritarianism in a ‘sectarianized’ new
Middle East. We do so through a discussion of the
three questions outlined in the introduction. By
drawing on examples from various parts of the
region, we address whether it is possible to iden-
tify a sectarian dimension in the techniques
employed by authoritarian regimes as part of their
regime survival strategy and what it may look like.
We then make a synchronic comparison of how
the Kuwaiti and Bahraini regimes – in quite
different ways – are using sectarianism as part of
their regime survival strategies. Finally, we make
a diachronic within-case analysis of Syria in order
to examine whether and how a sectarian in-
strumentalization of institutions matters for
authoritarian resilience over the long term.
WAYS OF PLAYING THE SECTARIAN CARD
One of the insights from the classic ‘post-
democratization’ debate concerns how author-
itarian regimes often employ a large variety of
techniques as part of their regime survival
strategies. If authoritarianism has become more
sectarian as suggested by Heydemann, this poses
the question of whether this insight also applies to
how regimes are ‘playing the sectarian card’ in the
sense of how they are manipulating sectarianism
in order to stay in power.21 In other words, to what
extent is it possible to identify a sectarian
dimension in more of the regime survival tech-
niques employed by authoritarian regimes? By
looking at the practices of different authoritarian
regimes across the region before, during and after
the Arab uprisings, it turns out that sectarianism
has become an important dimension for a number
of regimes. It also becomes clear that a variety of
authoritarian techniques can involve a sectarian
dimension ranging from the design of different
kinds of state institutions to how regimes
manipulate societal dynamics. 
     One kind of institutions are those in the
military/security sector, whose loyalty is vital for
the ability of a regime to repress citizens by force
if necessary.22 Recruitment to military, security or
intelligence services can, for instance, be based on
selective sectarian criteria based on the as-
sumption that some groups are more loyal. In
Bahrain, where the al Khalifa regime is Sunni, but
the population majority is Shia, 98 percent of the
security apparatus are Sunni23 and in Syria where
the majority is Sunni, the Alawis dominate it.24
Regimes can also hire foreign mercenaries based
on sectarian criteria as in Bahrain, where these are
mainly Sunnis from countries like Pakistan,
Yemen and Jordan.25 They can also invite
intervention by foreign supporters, as in Syria,
where the regime is supported by Afghani, Iranian
or Iraqi Shiite militias.26 Yet another example is
the mobilization of paramilitary sectarian
networks like the Syrian shabiha or Shia-militias
in Iraq.27
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     There can also be a sectarian dimension in how
regimes design representative political institutions
and engineer elections as a way of ‘divide and rule’.
As Justin Gengler explains, these institutions are
important as their design structures the nature of
contestation and cooperation between citizens
and how they relate to the state.28 In places such
as Bahrain, Kuwait or Lebanon,29 electoral laws
and districts are thus carefully engineered as part
of a ‘sectarian gerrymandering’ in order to secure
a specific balance representing members of
different sects or to ensure that specific groups are
underrepresented in the parliaments.30 In some
districts in Bahrain, one Sunni vote, for instance,
equals 21 Shia votes.31 Political institutions and
elections can also be designed to encourage po-
litical competition based on latent social dis-
tinctions – such as sectarian identities – rather
than (cross-sectarian) issue preferences, for ins-
tance by banning formal political parties. 
     In some places, it is also possible to identify a
sectarian political economy in the design of welfare
institutions. In a critique of the notion of a ‘uni-
versal rentier social contract’, Gengler has, for ins-
tance, showed how rent-based regimes in places
like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, instead of deploy-
ing limited resources inefficiently upon the whole
society, are employing a ‘targeted redistribution’:
a finite category of loyal citizens, usually based on
sectarian criteria, are rewarded. They therefore get
direct economic-cum-political stake in defending
the existing system, while the remaining
population is excluded from these benefits.32
     As a way of legitimizing a ruling regime,
various institutions, including religious ones, can
also be used to promote a selective nation-building
narrative centred around the regime and a specific
sect, while other groups and events are written out
of the official narrative about the nation. Thus, in
Bahrain the national narrative accentuates the
country’s Sunni heritage. At the same time, it
deemphasizes the time before the arrival in 1783
of the ruling Sunni al Khalifa family to the island,
which at that time was predominantly Shia and an
important part of the Shiite world. In a discussion
of heritage politics in Bahrain, Thomas Fibiger, for
instance, points out how the story about Shia
shrines is not told at the Bahraini National
Museum, and how some of the historical graves
of famous figures in Shia history – just like a
number of Shia mosques – were tarnished or de-
stroyed as a response to the 2011 uprisings.33
     In addition to the design of various state in-
stitutions, regimes may also try to engineer a
society’s demographic composition based on a
sectarian logic. In the 1970s and ‘80s, Kuwait, for
instance, granted citizenship to more than 200
000 Sunni tribesmen, first in order to marginalize
Nasserists and later to dilute the electoral in-
fluence of Shias.34 In Bahrain, the regime has
naturalized foreign Sunnis in return for police or
military service – up to 50 000 per year.35 At the
same time, the regime stripped citizenship from
almost 500 mainly Shia Bahrainis who have been
outspoken about democratic reforms and human
rights abuses, including Bahrain’s most prominent
Shiite cleric, Sheikh Isa Qassim.
     Besides this demographic engineering, it is also
possible to detect a sectarian dimension in how
authoritarian regimes try to influence societal dy-
namics by cultivating fear and seeding divisions
and discord among different groups in the society
in order to avoid crosscutting issue-based
coalitions. When it comes to civil society, this is
reflected in a selective treatment of different ngos
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and a de facto acceptance or even promotion of
‘sectarianism from below’ by so-called ‘sectarian
identity entrepreneurs’, who capitalize on making
sectarian identities the defining marker of a
particular segment of society.36 In a study of
sectarian identities in Lebanese civil society,
Bassel Salloukh and Janine Clark for instance
show how sectarian elites accept or even promote
ngos based on vertical sectarian ties, whereas
cross/non/anti-sectarian ngos are harassed or
marginalized.37 Similarly, during the 2011 upris-
ings in Bahrain, the regime was very keen not only
on cracking down on Shia dissidents, but also
punishing those Sunni groups and individuals
who had rejected the official ‘sectarian narrative’
and joined ranks with the Shia-led opposition and
their calls for cross-sectarian cooperation and
democratic reforms. At the same time, the regime
supported the rise of the pan-Sunni block, The
National Unity Gathering, and, according to some
reports, used the so-called baltajiyya, agent
provocateurs or thugs, to stir up sectarian tensions
in mixed-sect neighbourhoods.38 At the broader
societal level, not only ‘sectarian identity en-
trepreneurs’ but also traditional and, not least,
new social media constitute important tools for
the regimes.39 These have proved useful to deflect
attention from non-sectarian issues concerning
corruption or political rights, delegitimize the op-
position, and promote fear of sectarian instability,
which according to Benstead will make people less
inclined to support demands for democracy.40 In
Syria, Bashar al-Asad, for instance portrayed the
2011 uprising as a violent sectarian plot led by
Sunni takfirists and himself as the protector of not
only the Alawis, but also other non-Sunni sects
and even secular Sunnis. In Saudi Arabia, the calls
for demonstrations on the ‘Day of Rage’ in March
2011 were denounced as a Shia conspiracy against
the Sunni majority.41 In the official narrative in
Bahrain, the oppositions’ demands for democratic
reforms were similarly reframed as a sectarian plot
led by an Iran-backed fifth column intent on in-
stalling Shia theocratic rule with no place for
Sunnis.  
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SURVIVAL STRATEGIES
While the previous section illustrated how
sectarianism can be part of a wide range of
different authoritarian techniques, this section
takes its point of departure in another awareness
in the post-democratization literature. Instead of
only making a distinction between democracies
versus autocracies, it is just as important to be
attentive to how authoritarianism comes in a
variety of forms and that different authoritarian
regimes may work in quite different ways. Against
this background, it is natural to ask whether
authoritarian regimes that are playing ‘the
sectarian card’ are necessarily following the same
regime survival strategy, even while they share the
overall goal of staying in power? In order to
address this question, this section compares
Kuwait and Bahrain, who at first sight appear very
similar. Both are Gulf monarchies with a
population consisting of Shia and Sunni Muslims
and ruled by Sunni royal families, who have used
sectarianism as part of their regime survival
strategy. Still, they differ from each other when it
comes to how these regimes are using
sectarianism and for what purpose. 
     Bahrain, which figured prominently in the
previous section, represents – along with for ins-
tance Saudi Arabia – a regime with a pronounced
top-down sectarian strategy. Thus, the al Khalifa
regime has deliberately tried to spur sectarian
conflict and narrowly presents itself as a protector
of the Sunnis, whom they try to co-opt, whereas
Shias are violently repressed. When it comes to
Kuwait, the Sunni al-Sabah ruling family shares
the same fundamental goal of regime survival as
their Sunni colleagues in Bahrain. They therefore
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also fear the emergence of a cross-sectarian op-
position with democratic demands. On closer in-
spection it becomes clear, however, that Sabahs
have adopted a very different strategy than the al
Khalifas, though sectarianism still figures as an
important dimension. 
     Instead of overt repression and top-down
sectarianism, the Sunni regime in Kuwait has not
only presented itself as an arbiter between and
protector of various groups in a divided and
increasingly sectarianized Kuwaiti society. It has
also relied on a quite distinct form of co-option –
namely of the Shia minority – as part of an
attempt to balance the various groups in society
and to split the opposition. This strategy is an out-
come of two trends in Kuwait. Firstly, the regime
has been concerned about a rising and increas-
ingly critical Sunni opposition from tribes and Is-
lamists. At the same time, the Shia minority, some
of which have also been critical of the regime and
demanded reforms, has been worried about the
intensified sectarianism at the societal level, not
least among some Sunni tribes and Islamists,
where anti-Shia orientations have gained ground
in recent decades.43 The Kuwaiti regime has used
this fear among the Shias to co-opt them, partly
by offering ministry positions and easing
restrictions on Shia religious spaces in return for
loyalty. As a result, Shia mps have become im-
portant voting allies of the government, and in the
mass protests in 2012, they remained loyal to the
regime.44
     Yet there are numerous indications of how the
Sunni Kuwaiti regime’s accommodating policy
towards the Shias has less to do with genuine
democratic or ecumenical views than an
authoritarian regime’s strategic calculations. The
regime has been willing to crack down on ins-
tances of strong oppositional Shia voices, has obst-
ructed cross-sectarian cooperation – such as the
late 1990s Popular Action Block that included li-
beral, tribal, Shia, and Sunni Islamist figures – and
seems to turn a blind eye to growing anti-Shia
sentiments at the societal level. Against this back-
ground, it seems fair to conclude that although the
drivers of sectarianism may be less top-down in
Kuwait than in Bahrain, the regime still uses
sectarianism as part of their regime survival
strategy to split the opposition and balance
various societal groups. 
THE CHANGING IMPACT OF SECTARIANISM
The impact of sectarianism on the viability of
authoritarianism in the Middle East must be as-
sessed, not only in respect to the short term utility
for authoritarian leaders from instrumentalizing
it but also by paying attention to the longer term
impact of instrumentalism on the stability and
effectiveness of governing institutions. This has
not only varied among seemingly similar
authoritarian regimes but also in the same regime
at different periods of its evolution. In the
following, this is illustrated through a diachronic
within-case analysis that compares the impact of
sectarianism on authoritarian governance in Syria
during Hafiz al-Asad and his son Bashar al-Asad. 
     The relation of sectarianism and authoritarian
institutions can be framed in terms of the neo-
patrimonial form of authoritarianism that
dominates the Middle East, in which personal
leadership is combined with bureaucratic
structures. While the construction of such re-
gimes typically instrumentalizes sectarianism or
other particularistic identities as assabiyeh binding
the core elite to the leader, whether this becomes
an obstacle to the construction of institutions
consolidating a stable base of regime power varies
considerably. It arguably depends on the balance
of personal and bureaucratic authority is a
particular case: the more patrimonial the regime,
the more likely sectarianism practices – such as
the sectarian recruitment of military/security
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forces and encouraging inter-sectarian conflict to
divide and rule – will debilitate bureaucratic
rationality and enervate the institutions needed to
incorporate cross-class, cross-sectarian coalitions.
However, if the bureaucratic/institutional side of
neo-patrimonialism is sufficiently developed, e.g.
some bureaucratic recruitment by merit or ruling
parties recruiting across sectarian lines, the more
inclusive they will be and the more sectarianism
can be diluted so that it does not become a threat
to long term stability. The inclusiveness of
authoritarian regimes has also rested on what has
been called a populist social contract in which po-
litical loyalty is traded for entitlements regardless
of communal background. By contrast, in post-
populist regimes that exclude the lower classes and
concentrate patronage resources in the hands of
regime-connected crony capitalists – with
different sects usually disproportionately re-
presented in both strata – the inclusiveness of in-
stitutions tends to shrink, at the risk of long-term
stability.
     The Ba’thist regime, neo-patrimonialism and
sectarianism: This Weberian understanding
enables us to make sense of the changing
interaction of identity and authoritarianism in the
evolution of rule in Ba’thist Syria. The Ba’th regime
was institutionalized under Hafiz al-Asad as a
populist version of neo-patrimonialism, a hybrid
that both exploited and yet also pursued other
practices which diluted sectarianism. The
patrimonial president appointed trusted fellow
Alawis to command elite army units and the
security forces. Also, however, senior Sunni po-
liticos and Ba’thi officers in his inner circle, while
not having independent bases of support, still
incorporated their own clientele networks; Alawi
officers also had Sunni business partners, as part
of a ’military-mercantile complex‘ centered on
Damascus. ‘Sectarian arithmetic‘ ensured re-
presentation of all sectarian groups in the party
politburo and council of ministers. At the base, a
cross-sectarian rural constituency was
incorporated, with the party penetrating and co-
opting Sunni as well a minority peasantry,
particularly land reform peasants. The populist
social contract traded political loyalty for benefits,
regardless of sectarian affiliation: free higher
education and government jobs for the salaried
middle class; job security for industrial workers;
land for peasants; subsidized food for the urban
masses and considerable upward mobility for
rurals of all sects. The Ba’th’s representation of
itself as the defender of the Arabs against Zionism
and imperialism, on the basis of a supra-state
Arab identity meant to subsume sectarian
differences, conferred some legitimacy on the re-
gime. The regime incorporated about half the
population (minorities, state employed middle
class, land reform peasants, the Damascene Sunni
bourgeoisie); the other half that felt excluded, on
the other hand, sympathized with the main
durable opposition to the regime, the Muslim
Brotherhood. The robustness of the Ba’th’s power
building formula proved itself during the Muslim
Brotherhood insurgency (1978–1982): while
explicitly framed in sectarian terms – that is, as a
movement representing the Sunni majority
against heretical ruling minorities, the
Brotherhood´s message remained largely urban in
appeal since most Sunni peasants remained
incorporated into the Ba’th constituency via pro-
peasant agrarian reforms.45The regime used loyal
Alawi troops– but also tribal recruited ones – to
brutally repress the uprising, particularly in the
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sack of Hama in 1982. The Ikhwan uprising left a
permanent mark, a desire for revenge by Sunni
militants and fear of such revanchism by the re-
gime, which sharply limited its capacity to become
more inclusive. The regime thus exploited
sectarian ties, and in this sense reproduced
sectarianism, but sectarian identities were not
officially allowed to take overt political form, with
Arab nationalism the inclusive identity that
legitimized Ba’th rule. And, the regime remained
cross-sectarian enough to dilute and repress
sectarian sentiments even if these persisted in
covert forms.46
     The Bashar al-Asad Period: Debilitation of the
Cross-sectarian Coalition: Hafiz’s regime had
depended on the availability of considerable rent
and when under his son, Bashar as-Asad, it
declined, the regime adopted neo-liberal policies
meant to attract investors. In the process, it
evolved into a post-populist version of
authoritarianism based on a state-crony capitalist
alliance that was both highly resistant to
democratization and vulnerable to communal
conflict. First, concentrating power in Bashar’s
hands meant pushing his father’s old Sunni barons
out of power, losing with them their clientele
networks among Sunni elites; some, such as Vice-
President Khaddam went into opposition. Second,
the concentration of the new business op-
portunities from the opening to private/foreign
capital in the hands of the presidential family, es-
pecially the president’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf,
alienated many of the former Sunni business
clients of the regime.47 Third, the running down
of the welfare state and cutting of food and fuel
subsidies and agricultural prices, combined with
the cumulative effect of population growth on
fixed land and devastating drought, cost the re-
gime the support of its peasant and lower class
constituencies. The result was that while the
patrimonial core of the regime became more
sectarian, the societal penetration of regime in-
stitutions, such as the party organization,
contracted and the concentration of patronage
shrunk its co-optative capacity. Social mobility be-
came sharply skewed in the hands of a few regime
insiders and clients.
     Others experienced downward pressure on
their living standards, and many of the losers
came to see sectarian discrimination at work. For
example, rumors spread that Alawi teachers were
taking the jobs of Sunnis in Raqqa and Hassakah,
where the regime was ineffective, if not negligent,
in addressing the devastation of the great drought
of 2008–2010. Symptomatic of popular
resentment of Alawi crony capitalists was the 2011
attack by protestors in Dera on the offices of Rami
Makhlouf ’s Syriatel. At the same time, the regime’s
encouragement of non-political Islam, first began
under Hafiz, had enabled the spread of Islamism
beyond its former concentration in the cities into
the suburbs and countryside where it shrunk
Hama after the massacre in 1982, with the destroyed
Al-Nuri Mosque, on the western bank of the Orontes
River, next to the Hama Castle.
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Ba’thism’s popular base and prepared the ideo-
logical ground for rural based Islamist
insurrection.48
     Once the Syria uprising evolved into armed
insurgency, the regime reconfigured itself to fight
a civil war, turning into a more coercive, exclusi-
vist – and de-centralized – form of neo-
patrimonialism. All those among the political elite
advocating compromise with the opposition were
purged and the regime core shrunk to the Asad
family and the inner security and military chiefs.
As the army was debilitated by mostly Sunni
defections, its Alawi composition was
accentuated, with much of the community
incorporated into the military and state apparatus.
Shrinking state resources were targeted at loyalists
and loyal regions; and responsibility for security
was decentralized to local, often sectarian,
militias. Most of the opposition was demonized as
terrorists and jihadists; the opposition, in re-
sponse to regime violence against it, was
militarized and Islamized, deploying sectarian
discourses that drove the minorities into
dependence for security on the regime. The
external intervention of sectarian fighters on both
sides and the security dilemma, in which all came
to depend on their own community against the
sectarian ’other,’ spread sectarianism to the grass-
roots of society. Thus, the collapse of inclusive in-
stitutions shrank the social base of the state, for
which a vastly increased use of coercion came to
substitute, with both greatly intensifying the
sectarian and territorial bifurcation of the country.
The regime was able to survive in good part owing
to massive intervention of its Russian, Iranian and
Shia Arab allies on its behalf.49
     The evolution of Ba’thist authoritarianism is
typical of the construction of authority in the
Middle East’s multi-sectarian states, both in its in-
strumentalization of sectarianism and in the
considerable variations in the extent to which this
was an asset or obstacle to the creation of
authoritarian power. For it to be an asset,
patrimonial practices – with sect instrumentalized
to generate elite solidarity around leaders – have
to be combined with enough bureaucratic
capacity to include cross-sectarian coalitions.
However, this delicate balance is easily upset,
particularly with the turn to post-populist
versions of authoritarianism. Thus, the changing
inclusiveness of Ba’thist institutions and political
economy strategies helps explain first the muting
of and thereafter the inflaming of sectarianism in
Syria, and the parallel move from robust
statehood to at least partial state failure. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we have revisited the classic debate
on durability and dynamism of authoritarianism
in the light of the recent ‘sectarianization’ of
Middle East politics. What conclusions can we
draw from the literature and our cases for the
relationship of sectarianism to authoritarian
resilience?
     First, sectarianism is widely instrumentalized
in the region’s sectarian-divided societies, with ap-
parently considerable utility for rulers, at least in
the short run, in co-opting constituents and divid-
ing and ruling populations. But there are
considerable variations in the short-term tech-
niques employed, with various mixtures of
coercion, divide and rule tactics, and cooptation
(either targeted solely to supportive sects or more
inclusive). 
     Second, the impact of sectarian instrument-
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alization on institutions (and the impact of the
latter on sectarianism) matters for authoritarian
resilience over the longer term. Institutions, such
as parliaments and parties, that enjoy some real
internal political life and can therefore effectively
coopt/include constituencies reduce the need for
coercion; moreover, in order to coerce effectively
one must have loyal constituents; it takes in-
stitutions to coopt broader social forces,
particularly coalitions cutting across sect and
class, and if they can effectively include roughly
half the population, regimes are much more able
to repress or deter opposition from the excluded
half. Syria under Hafiz and Kuwait appear to have
had effective institutions; when these declined, as
in Bahrain after the dismissal of the parliament
and in Bashar’s Syria, with the debilitation of the
Ba’th party, inclusion contracted and coercion be-
came more necessary; but this may only provoke
revolution or costly civil war. 
     Once regimes are weakened in this way they
become vulnerable to trans-state interference.
Then, whether they can survive depends on
whether the balance of intervention is such that
supportive allies can outbid hostile powers and
shift the internal power struggle on behalf of the
regime. Thus the Saudi/uae intervention in
Bahrain saved the Bahraini regime.  Likewise, the
Hizbollah/Iran/Shia militia intervention in Syria,
later followed by Russia, shifted the balance of
intervention that was initially against Bashar al-
Asad, back in his favor. Needless to say, the
interventions have been driven in good part by the
regional power struggle between Sunni Saudi
Arabia and Shia Iran. Such interventions come at
the cost of inflamed sectarian polarization over
the longer term.
     Third, if we ask why there are such variations
in the tactics of sectarian instrumentalization and
the balance between inclusion and exclusion,
several factors suggest themselves. Inclusion is as-
sisted by a populist social contract and regimes
that come to power in popular revolts form below,
such as Ba’thist Syria, will opt to legitimize them-
selves in such terms. Whether or not there are
sharp polarizing sectarian cleavages that can be
exploited, as in Bahrain, but less so in Kuwait, may
shape regime strategies, too. The availability of
resources, of course, also matters: compared to
Hafiz’s Syria and Kuwait, Bashar’s Syria and
Bahrain enjoyed much less rent to serve as
patronage, hence less co-optative capability.
Finally, the existing global order affects Middle
East’s elite strategies and options. In the period of
Cold War, socialism and Keynesian capitalism,
resource availability and an egalitarian normative
climate favored populism and inclusion. The
current neo-liberal world order, with its
legitimation of vast inequalities, imf-driven aus-
terity for the masses and (perhaps inadvertent)
promotion of crony capitalism via pressures for
privatization, encourages exclusion and indeed is
associated with crowing communal conflict
worldwide.50
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